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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Thomas Carbonneau

 
 
 Adjudication is vital to society and its operations.  The law and legal proceedings, 
along with international acrimony, demonstrate that there is no end to human discord.  In 
the United States, fundamental political values are inextricably linked to law.  The Bill of 
Rights protects citizens from the State encroachments to their person and property.  
Freedom is the principal attribute of American citizenship.  Public law requires the State 
to comply with an exacting level of due process when it seeks to restrict citizen freedoms. 
 American citizenship also sports a more private and mundane face.  The daily life 
of the American citizen can lead to conflicts that engender private civil disputes.  Public 
law guarantees still apply to legal proceedings involving private claims between 
individual citizens.  There are evident differences between criminal and civil 
proceedings, the most evident of which is the standard for reaching a liability 
determination (beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed to a preponderance of the 
evidence).  Fairness, in the form of the impartiality of decision-makers and parity 
between the parties, however, applies to both processes—only the depth of the imprint 
differs.   
 The costs and risks generally associated to litigation push both processes to avoid 
trials and adjudicated outcomes.  Plea-bargains are prevalent in criminal trials and civil 
trials often result in settlements.  Justice, in effect, is done through the avoidance of trial 
determinations. The uncertainty of pursuing rights guarantees is so great that parties 
prefer to avoid the established machinery of justice.  Ironically, the promise of justice is 
most achievable when the mechanisms of justice are ignored. 
 The failure of justice processes to function as designed testifies both to the rigor 
of the public law analysis and the virtual impossibility of achieving its ends.  In most 
cases, the required expenditure of resources exceeds both individual and societal 
capabilities.  The legal procedure demanded by the Constitution, even in civil matters, 
becomes an unworkable burden.  Nonetheless, American jurists would find it untenable 
to adjust the foundational principles of the judicial trial and adapted them to the 
exigencies of a more populous and complex society.  In fact, these jurists would contend 
that society, no matter its current status or stage of evolution, should conform to the 
immutable verities of the law. 
 Arbitration intermediated the seismic rift between society’s need to resolve 
conflict and the law’s unbending regime of adjudicatory governance by proffering a 
remedy that was at once fair and functional.  While a majority of the modern U.S. 
Supreme Court has been favorably disposed to arbitration, other groups have advanced 
more critical assessments of arbitral adjudication.  The most controversial aspect of the 
contemporary social usage and standing of arbitration centers upon adhesive arbitration 
in employment and consumer matters.  Criticism also flared regarding arbitration in the 
state-investor context, relating to the business leanings and partiality of NAFTA 
arbitrators, but the misgivings were quelled once hearings were open to the public.  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s evaluation of arbitration bears the greatest practical 
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weight, the critique made by various interest groups is based on a set of common values 
that endorse the supremacy of the public law guarantees. 
 For some groups, arbitral adjudication is a profound wrong.   Its simpleminded 
vision of the trial should be relegated to the darkest recesses of specialized commercial 
activities.  Public justice tolerates no substitute—even when parties freely and willingly 
consent to alternative processes.  Justice is as singular as the Constitution that commands 
it.  Adjudication cannot take place without party-driven trials, extensive discovery and 
record-building, unrelenting cross-examination, and the exhaustion of all possible 
remedies, including appeal.  For other groups, arbitration is the perfect private remedy—
an oasis of rationality in the turbulent lunacy of procedural justice.  The obsession with 
winning is replaced with a sensible protocol that posits that loss occasioned by a fair 
hearing at the hands of a knowledgeable adjudicator is both acceptable and civilized.  
Incessant lawyer advocacy is a false offering that services primarily the advocate’s 
interest—not the client’s.  Arbitration fulfills the promise of American citizenship and 
does not impose a crushing surcharge on the operations of American society.  It puts an 
end to conflict in a traditionalist manner, yet avoids perpetual retakes and 
reconsiderations. 
 The presence of arbitration at the center of the adjudicatory arena mandates that 
society choose how it will behave.  When citizens are in conflict, should society trust the 
decision-makers or obligate them to assume the neutral status of a referee and thereby 
endorse resolution through procedural protections implemented by advocates?  Society’s 
choice for civil adjudication is between two forms of trial—one that is disciplined, but 
functional and effective and another that is dedicated to the protection of legal rights 
through absolute procedural rectitudea form of protection so resolute that it 
undermines its own operation.  To a substantial degree, the choice represents a struggle 
between endorsing the pragmatic and workable or what is painstakingly difficult and 
inefficient—the myths surrounding the belief in the exclusive righteousness of 
adjudication done pursuant to public law strictures.  Will a mentality of achievement or a 
belief in immutable truths prevail and become the backbone of adjudication in American 
society?  It is difficult to resist admiring what works, especially when the competing 
choice is a rhetorical, often sanctimonious set of beliefs that frequently fail to provide 
protection to anything or anyone. 
 The symposium participants have ably engaged in a discussion about the 
protection of rights and considered in their assessment of remedies the allocation of 
resources for competing social endeavors.  There can be little doubt that arbitration 
represents a nearly miraculous solution to the due process and affordability dilemma.  
Because it is private, arbitration eliminates the demands on public resources and monies.  
The general professionalism and self-interest of arbitrators and the presence of lawyers in 
the proceedings validate arbitration as a rights protection mechanism.  Southland
1
and the 
latest per curiam opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court
2
 indicate that the federal right to 
arbitrate is firmly rooted in U.S. law.
3
  For all intents and purposes, it is a right with 
                                                 
1
 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
2
 Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C, v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012). 
3
 “But the Oklahoma Supreme Court must abide by the FAA, which is [‘]the supreme Law of the 
Land,[’] U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2, and by the opinions of this court interpreting that law.”  Howard, 133 S. 
Ct. at 503. 
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constitutional dimensions that rivals the right to political expression and to be free of 
invidious discrimination based on race.  The Ninth Circuit,
4
 and increasingly the Second 
Circuit,
5
 have dissented from the U.S. Supreme Court’s unfailing support of arbitration, 
but the opposition—especially adamant in the matter of adhesion—has been ineffective 
and is seemingly destined to remain so.  Members of the Court disagree in different sets 
of circumstances and, periodically, there are anti-arbitration decisions, but the support for 
arbitration on the Court seems to be wide and deep.
6
  
 The only inkling of imperfect consensus resides in an apparently emerging power 
struggle between the various players in the process as to which of them will set the 
ultimate direction for the regulation of arbitration.
7
  Four players have the potential to 
decide: the parties, the courts, the arbitrators, and arbitral institutions.  A fifth player is 
society at large acting through the legislative process, an institution which—since 1925—
has been remarkably and mercifully silent on the subject of arbitration.  Freedom of 
contract may be vital to the development of arbitration.  The transborder and domestic 
history of arbitration, however, indicates, without equivocation, that judicial approval and 
support are crucial to its effectiveness.  Courts can convert the most favorable statutory 
regime into a jungle of deadly opposition.
8
  The California decisional law on arbitration 
is a perfect illustration.
9
  It is evident at both the state and federal judicial levels that 
current judges have been persuaded to support arbitration; they believe that they have a 
duty to uphold arbitration agreements and awards given the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
construction of the Federal Arbitration Act and the vibrant application of the federal 
preemption doctrine.
10
  Accordingly, arbitrators ‘take the baton’ from the parties and, 
with minimal supervision from arbitral institutions, conduct the proceedings and resolve 
the merits, unless the agreement or the law places special restrains on their exercise of 
power. 
 In the context of class action litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court has, on the one 
hand, heralded the superiority of arbitration and contract choice and, on the other hand, 
completely undermined the autonomous operation of arbitration by vacating the 
arbitrators’ interpretation of the arbitration agreement as an ‘excess of authority.’  The 
description of the contrastive approaches is reflected in the contradistinctive holdings in 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
11
 and Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, Inc.
12
  The result in 
AT&T Mobility establishes that class action waivers are a legitimate part of the bargain 
for arbitration and dismisses adhesion as a flaw in the formation of an arbitration 
                                                 
4
 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, ch. 4 (4th ed. 2012). 
5
 See, e.g., In re Am Express Merchs. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,130 S.Ct. 2401 (2010);  see also In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
6
 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at xiii-xxii. 
7
 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002). 
8
 See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1343 (2009). 
9
 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4.  
10
 See id. at ch. 5. 
11
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
12
 Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
253 
 
agreement.
13
  In a completely contrary vein, Stolt-Nielsen places significant and decisive 
restraints on the ability of arbitrators to rule on matters that are instrumental to the 
independence of the arbitral process.
14
  The difference in approach and result places a 
cloud of indeterminacy over the future direction of arbitration law. 
 Stolt-Nielsen, like Hall Street Associates,
15
 Volt Information Sciences,
16
 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,
17
 Wilko v. Swan,
18
 may indicate a turning point in the U.S. 
law of arbitration.  There are clear problems with the privatizing of adjudication in 
Western democratic societies.  Despite 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett,
19
 the arbitrability of civil 
rights claims remains a debatable addition to arbitrable subject matters.  How arbitrators 
are qualified and to whom or what they owe allegiance are concerns that remain 
unaddressed despite the strength of the federal policy favoring arbitration and contract 
freedom.  Whether greater regulation or supervision of the arbitral process is a good idea 
is another festering matter.  Current practice has given the impartiality of arbitrators a 
renewed significance in the litigious regulation of the arbitral process.
20
  It is unclear 
whether the latter has ‘improved’ the process or simply made it vulnerable to a new form 
of attack from disgruntled parties.  As the U.S. Supreme Court itself has made evident on 
a number of occasions,
21
 greater litigation about arbitration, and its enhanced 
adversarialization, will have alternative adjudication return, full circle, to the status quo 
ante. 
 The definition and discussion of issues and procedural law are an important part 
of justice in a democracy.  It is clear that arbitration has become instrumental to the ‘life 
of the law’22 and that the decisional work of the courts regulates the operation of the 
arbitral process.  Academic discussion like the one that has taken place are most valuable 
when they assess the content of actual judicial holdings and contribute to maintaining a 
functional and fair process of adjudication.  I applaud both the student editors who so 
ably organized this event and the distinguished academic lawyers who contributed to the 
quality of the discussion—from a warning about oligarchs to the merger of alternative 
remedies and including an evaluation of the impact of arbitration on administrative 
processes and ending with a brief for the stakeholders of investment arbitration processes.   
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 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at ch. 5. 
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 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
16
 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
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 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
19
 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
20
 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 527.  
21
 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
22
 A reference to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous observation that: “The life of the law has 
not been logic; it has been experience.”  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
